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It has been shown by Whately, Perelman, Johnstone, Hintikka, Barth and
Krabbe, and Meyer, that philosophical argumentation is  based on a
framework of i nteractive question-answer dialogue between two speakers
who take opposing sides on a controversial issue. Of course, this tradition
is no novelty in philosophy, and is most closely identified with Socratic
dialogue as a model of philosophical argument.
If one takes this conception of philosophical argument seriously, tradi-
tional informal fallacies like the petitio principii, argumentum ad hominem,
and argumentum ad ignorantiam are revealed as (a) not fallacies in many
instances, but forms of plausible reasoning that can be reasonable argu-
ments to shift a burden of proof, and (b) extremely important types of
criticism in argumentation that can have the legitimate function of shifting
a burden or weight of evidence against, or in favor of presumptions in an
argument. However, these traditional categories of argument called in-
formal fallacies can only be themselves revealed as deeply interesting and
fundamental objects of study for philosophy once some headway has been
made in understanding the underlying concept of burden of proof in
argument. But the literature offers more questions than answers on the
subject of burden of proof.
The arguments of this paper are motivated by an interest in trying to
provide answers for the following six questions.
1.
	
How does burden of proof get set initially in reasoned dialogue?
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2. Once burden of proof gets set in reasoned dialogue, how is it
binding upon the subsequent moves of the participants in
argument?
3.          Can burden of proof be set externally,  before dialogue begins?
Or is it set internally, during the course of dialogue, by the
participants?
4. How does burden of proof relate to the argumentum ad
ignorantiam, the traditional informal fallacy of arguing from
ignorance?
5. How is burden of proof related to plausibility? Does the
burden of proof rest on the interlocutor who attacks an estab-
lished point of view'?
6. Does burden of proof work the same way in conversational
argumentation as it does in legal argument? Or are the two
contexts essentially different?
In fact, this paper will not provide fully adequate answers to each of these
questions, for the answers are to be sought in (a) a theory of plausible
reasoning, and (b) a theory of reasoned dialogue as a normative tool for
the analysis of argumentation. Even so, by drawing on some existing
resources in (a) and (b), and by critically examining certain aspects of
these theories as they relate to burden of proof, this paper aims to further
our understanding of the concept of burden of proof as an important
component of the study of argumentation.
In this paper, burden of proof is defined as an allocation made in
reasoned dialogue which sets a strength (weight) of argument required by
one side to reasonably persuade the other side. Making this definition
useful presupposes prior definition of the concept of reasoned dialogue,
and, in particular, the concept of persuasive reasoned dialogue.
In examining any particular text of argumentative discourse, the ques-
tion may (and should) be asked: what strength of evidence is required to
persuade? In most cases of argumentative discourse on controversial
issues in natural language, certain evidence is not required to establish a
claim. In some cases, no evidence at all need be required - for example if
a proposition is already accepted by all participants, and is not subject to
doubt or challenge. In other cases, a tiny amount of evidence can reason-
ably swing the outcome to one side - for example, if arguments on both
sides are equally balanced. Thus to understand the concept of burden of
proof in reasoned argumentation, we must come to understand how the
initial plausibility of a proposition can come to be altered - either raised





1.  SUBTLE SHIFTS I N REASONED DIALOGUE: THE LINK WITH FALLACIES
Recognition and use of burden of proof in argumentation can be a
powerful factor in reasoned persuasion, and yet it is a subtlety, in many
cases, that is overlooked. Consider the following parliamentary question-
reply exchange.
Q: Why are my constituents the targets of such savage and un-
acceptable cutbacks?
A: The Government is doing the best it can to retrain employees
and proceed in a humane manner.
This answer may be a reasonable reply to the question, as far as it goes.
But where the respondent may have significantly failed is through not
having questioned the presupposition of the question that the cutbacks
were "savage and unacceptable." Because this presupposition of the
question, in effect, makes a positive assertion of a contentious proposition,
there is a burden of proof on the questioner to back it up if challenged. By
not raising this challenge in his response, the respondent concedes too
much to the side of the opposition. In effect, the response makes the
Government seem guilty of the unacceptable offenses argumentatively
advanced in the question. By failing to shift the burden of proof back onto
the questioner, the respondent overlooks his strongest argument on the
issue of contention.
Whately (1846, 1963, p. 113) warned against this type of strategic
failure in argumentation when he compared it to the case of an army
occupying a fort that it is perfectly capable of defending. By sallying forth
into the open field, they are defeated. Similarly, in argument, if you forget
to insist that there is a burden of proof on your opponent's side which you
can show has not been met, and instead use positive arguments that may
be weak, to try to defend your own side, you may be succumbing to a
feeble defense by overlooking your strongest arguments. Whately (p. 114)
quotes the French proverb "Qui  s'excuse, s'accuse." to illustrate the
unfortunate instance of a respondent who unnecessarily makes himself
appear guilty in the face of an accusation by taking on the burden of trying
to prove his own innocence, when what he should be doing is to defy his
accuser to prove his charge.
Whately's excellent advice reveals that mounting a persuasive argument
in reasoned question-reply dialogue requires a fine tuning and awareness
of matters of burden of proof. Further evidence from Hamblin (1970)
and Walton (1985) suggests that in fact many of the so-called "informal
fallacies" are important kinds of persuasive strategies in argumentation
precisely because they reflect subtle shifts in the burden of proof that can
be powerfully effective, yet often go unnoticed in the heat of a dispute.




i mportant kinds of argument traditionally classified as informal fallacies:
the ad hominem, the petitio principii and the ad ignorantiam.
One of the most famous cases of the circumstantial ad hominem
argument is the reply of the sportsman who is accused of barbarity in
sacrificing hares or trout: "Why do you feed on the flesh of harmless
cattle?" This rejoinder, in the form of a question, attempts to use the
critic's own personal circumstances (being a meat-eater) against his critic-
ism of the sportsman. This case has been analyzed at length in Walton
(1985), but Hamblin's remarks on it (1970, p. 174) show how Whately
(1846) had already understood that the deeper strategy behind this type of
case of ad hominem argument is linked to a shift in the burden of proof.
The rhetorical effectiveness of the sportsman's rejoinder as a ploy in
argument is to be sought in the way  it shifts the burden of proof onto the
critic. By appearing to make the critic responsible for the very type of
act he condemns, the question puts the critic on the defensive. For the
question has made the critic appear to be inconsistent in word and deed.
But if the critic gives in to this demand to justify his own non-vegetarian
practices, he will have succumbed to the ploy. What he should do instead
is to shift the burden of proof back onto the question by citing the failure
of the parallel between two propositions: (1) the barbarity in hunting, and
(2) the eating of meat. For no inconsistency between these two propositions
has yet been established. The burden of proof is to show that there is an
inconsistency remains on the questioner.
Another traditional informal fallacy where understanding the mechanism
of what is "fallacious" is importantly linked to the concept of burden of
proof is the petitio principii.
 
First, a careful distinction should be made
between begging the question and arguing in a circle. It has been shown in
Walton and Batten (1978) that arguing in a circle is not necessarily
erroneous or subject to refutation in every instance, and that we should
distinguish between vicious circles and benign circles.
By contrast, begging the question would appear to be best construed as
an argument that should be open to serious criticism whenever it occurs in
reasoned dialogue. The reason for this thesis is that the very idea of
begging the question is linked to the context of dialogue where there is
an obligation to prove. Begging the question is inappropriate precisely





basic idea behind this failure is that an arguer must prove or
give evidence for his conclusion. He cannot just ask for  it, in this context,
as an assumption to be freely granted by his opponent in dialogue at no
cost. By this conception, begging the question is an improper move
whenever it occurs in reasoned persuasive dialogue. An argument that
begs the question could be formally valid, but it is not useful to persuade a
rational opponent in dialogue precisely because it fails to meet the
requirement of burden of proof. So it is the burden of proof that makes
begging the question a species of vicious circle.




The traditional informal fallacy of the argumentum ad ignorantiam is said
to have been committed whenever it is argued that a proposition is true on
the basis that it has not been proved false.2 Or conversely, the same fallacy
is said to occur when it is argued that a proposition is false on the basis
that it has not been proved true. Clearly the argument from ignorance can,
in certain cases, be a significant kind of erroneous inference in scientific
method. For absence of experimental support for a hypothesis may be
different from positive evidence that would refute the hypothesis. And in
mathematics, lack of proof may fall short of u nprovability. Hence we are
rightly warned about the dangers of arguing from ignorance.
But some cases suggest that arguments that  appear to be arguments  
from ignorance can be non-fallacious. Suppose a thorough FBI investigation
fails to turn up any evidence that Bob is a Soviet spy. The investigating
commission may conclude that Bob is not a Soviet spy. Granted, their
argument could be j udged erroneous if they claim the conclusion to be
established with absolute certainty. But if the argument only purports
to establish that the conclusion is plausible, it could be a reasonable
argument. At any rate, it would seem peremptory to condemn it as
fallacious if the investigation has been thorough and the presumption of
Bob's innocence of the charge of espionage is taken as a tentative conclu-
sion that could be subject of further inquiry.3
Another puzzle about this argument stems from the question of
whether it is really an ad ignorantiam argument. For the commission's
careful investigation could perhaps be described as a kind of positive
evidence that Bob is not a Soviet spy. So construed, the argument above
may not be an argument from ignorance at all. It could be claimed that the
investigation has not left us ignorant. It has given the commission some
knowledge about what Bob is not.
Thus there is room to question here whether arguments cited as cases
of the argumentum ad ignorantiam are really arguments from ignorance.
So perhaps if or when they are "fallacious," the failure may not he due, at
least entirely, t o their being arguments from ignorance. They could simply
be weak arguments in the same way arguments based on knowledge (or
non-ignorance) can be weak.
How should the argument from ignorance be defined? The best account
i n the framework of the theory of reasoned dialogue exhibits the form of




ad ignorantiam argument, the arguer shifts from a position of not being
committed to a proposition A to a position of being committed to not-A.
The inference is from lack of commitment to rejection.
Lack of commitment need not imply total ignorance. Consequently, the
argumentum ad  ignorantiam can sometimes be a reasonable dialectical
shift.
One context of dialogue where ad ignorantiam reasoning is not falla-
cious is that of reasoned, practical commitment to a course of action in the
face of lack of positive evidence. Suppose Larry picks up a gun, but has no
information on whether the gun is loaded or not. It may make sense for
him to presume that the gun is, or may be loaded, and to suit his actions
of handling the gun to accord with that presumption. Larry's reasoning
could be non-fallacious, even if he has no positive evidence to prove that
the gun is loaded.
This argument does seem to be a characteristic ad ignorantiam which
goes from a premise of non-commitment to a proposition A to a conclu-
sion of commitment to not-A. Yet contrary to the presumption that such
arguments are fallacious, this one could be reasonable. Such examples of
plausible reasoning in the face of uncertainty are common and reasonable
in contexts where there is a need for a commitment to pursue a course of
action or inaction in the absence of clear evidence.
Another context of dialogue where ad ignorantiam reasoning is not
fallacious is the framework of argument in the criminal trial. If the
prosecution has not proved guilt, this correctly warrants a finding of not
guilty as the conclusion of the sequence of argumentation in the trial. This
ad ignorantiam argument is non-fallacious because of the burden of proof
in the criminal trial.
Civil cases also illustrate interesting ad ignorantiam arguments. Con-
sider a case where the plaintiff claims to have left her dress at a dry
cleaning establishment. Despite having lost the receipt for having deposited
the dress at the cleaner's, she claims compensation for the loss of the
dress. The defendant produces his books, and claims there was no record
of  his receipt of the dress.
In this case, the plaintiff was unable to prove the defendant received the
dress, therefore the judge ruled for the defendant. This appears to be an
ad ignorantiam argument. But it is a reasonable one, because the burden
of proof is on the customer to prove by a receipt that she had deposited
the item at the cleaner's.
On the other hand, suppose the plaintiff argued that the cleaning
proprietor was unable to prove non-delivery of the dress from his records,
therefore my contention that I did deliver the dress is justified. This would
be a fallacious use of the argumentum ad ignorantiam.
The difference between the reasonable and the fallacious instance of




the burden of proof. The plaintiff's argument was judged inadequate in
this case because she failed to do what was necessary to discharge the
burden of proof.
3.  REASONED DIALOGUE
A burden of proof, by its very nature, attaches to one side of an argument.
When such a burden is incurred, the weight of evidence required to
support the other side of the argument is thereby lightened. Therefore,
burden of proof only makes sense in relation to a concept of argument as
reasoned dialogue, where there are two sides to the argument.
The concept of burden of proof only makes sense in relation to a
concept of argument as a balance, with weights on each side. As more
weight is placed on one side, the other side becomes relatively lighter.
And as more weight is removed from the one side, the other side may be
viewed as having relatively more weight. The corresponding shift is
indicated by the raising of the balance on one side and the lowering of the
balance on the other.
But in order for adjustments of burden of proof in an argument to be
"reasoned," the two-sided dialogue must have procedural rules that are
"reasonable" or that somehow represent, or are related to rules of logic.
The concept of reasoned dialogue required to support such a conception
must have the following components.4
1. Two Sides. There must be two participants in the dialogue,
each of whom represents one side. Normally, they are called
the Proponent and the Respondent.
2. Moves. Each participant must take his turn making a move, in a
sequence of pairs of moves. Normally, each move is either a
question or a reply to a question which can take the form of an
assertion.
3. Commitments. Attached to each side is a set of propositions
called a
 
commitment-set. At each move, propositions may be
inserted into or removed from a participant's commitment-set.
4. Rules of Procedure. The function of the rules is to define the
conditions under which specific propositions are to be inserted
i nto or deleted from a participant's commitment-set at each
characteristic type of move.
5. Goal of Dialogue.  The dialogue must have some specific goal
or criterion of success, so that a particular type of sequence of
moves, according to the rules, counts as a successful culmina-
tion or resolution of the dialogue.




side is to persuade the other side. In this type of dialogue, each participant
has a specific proposition designated or declared as his thesis, to be
proved or argued for. The thesis for each side must be proved exclusively
from the premises (commitments) of the other side, by means of moves of
inference allowed by the rules.
GOALS OF PERSUASIVE DIALOGUE
In a particular type of persuasion dialogue called a dispute, the thesis of
the one participant must be the opposite (negation) of the thesis of the
other participant. Not all reasoned dialogues are persuasion dialogues.
And not all persuasion dialogues are disputes. In some dialogues, the goal
of one side is to prove a particular thesis while the goal of' the other side is
merely to throw doubt on the first side's attempted proofs. This is an
asymmetrical type of dialogue which is not, strictly speaking, a dispute in
the sense above, and it could be called a weakly opposed difference of 
opinion. According to another usage, both these kinds of dialogue could
be called disputes, and we could distinguish between strongly opposed
disputes and weakly opposed disputes.
A reasoned dialogue is essentially an ordered sequence of pairs of
moves which begins at an initial move or opening stage, and proceeds
towards a final move, or closing stage. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst
(1984) distinguish an initial phase of reasoned dialogue they identify with
the initial confrontation, where the participants articulate the goals of the
dialogue and clarify or agree on some of the procedural rules. These
agreements or clarifications, to the extent that they are known in a
particular case, according to an interpretation of the given text of dis-
course, serve to define the purpose and scope of the dialogue in an
over-all way. These matters define the context of dialogue in a global
manner. Thus global conventions, rules, or agreements pertain to the
whole dialogue as a collective sequence of moves. By contrast local




For example, the setting of the thesis of a participant at the outset of
dialogue is a global consideration, for this designation, once set, affects
every subsequent move. By contrast, a local consideration could be
whether a specific reply, at some particular point in the dialogue, is an
acceptable response to the preceding question posed by the other side. In
general, evaluations of particular features of a dialogue can be assessed in
a more global or more local perspective. This will particularly be appro-
priate in the case of burden of proof.
What makes reasoned dialogue reasoned is the use of logical rules of
inference in both directions on the two sides of question-reply argumenta-
tion. First, a participant uses forward-chaining sequences of argument in
proving conclusions from the other participant's premises.5 For example, if
the Respondent has conceded propositions A and 'If A then B,' the
Proponent may then prove B by the following forward-chaining use of
modus ponens: If A then B, A; therefore B. Assuming that modus ponens
is a logical rule of this particular context of dialogue, we may say that the
Proponent has proved  B. Depending on the commitment rules, the
Respondent may then be required to accept B, and B becomes inserted
into his commitment-set.
However, logical inferences can also be used in a backward-chaining
manner, meaning that a participant may "reason backwards" from his
conclusion to pick out the premises in his commitment-set that were used
(or could be used) to derive that conclusion. For example, suppose the
Proponent has committed himself to proposition B. At a proper juncture
i n the dialogue, the Respondent may challenge the Proponent with a
why-question, "Why B?" A why-question directs a request for explanation
or proof of a proposition to l the participant who is committed to that
proposition. The rules of dialogue will determine when a respondent is
required to give a direct answer to a why-question.6 If the Proponent
accepts the challenge, he might respond with the backwards-chaining
modus ponens reply:  If A then B, A; therefore B. In this event, the
Proponent will have shown how B can be inferred, according to the
logical rules of the dialogue, from a set of premises.
It is generally important to recognize that the concept of reasoned
dialogue is an idealization, an abstract, theoretical device that provides a
normative profile against which any particular text of realistic dialogue can
be measured or evaluated in various respects. On the other hand, this
theoretical device is useful because it can be applied to commonplace
reasoning.
According to Hamblin (1970, p. 256), the study of dialogue can be
pursued formally (theoretically) or descriptively, where actual texts of
discourse can be studied. The concept of burden of proof is so useful and





Burden of proof is characteristically linked to the problem of an agent
who must decide on a course of action or inaction in a rapidly changing,
complex particular situation where certain knowledge, or even probable
knowledge, cannot be acquired in time to make the best decision. Very
often, in such situations, an agent must act on the basis of plausible
presumptions about what can reasonably be expected to happen in the
given situation, based on usual expectations, customary routines, and
commonsense understanding of institutions, functions, and familiar se-
quences of actions. This type of decision is based on what is reasonably
foreseeable, even if such an outcome is improbable.
Much commonplace reasoning is based on the idea that as human
agents, we are in the world, in a given environment of the moment that is
constantly in a state of flux. In this situation, even doing nothing can be a
form of action (significant omission or refraining). In this predicament,
reasoning starts with a basic horizon, so that the decision-maker is
presented with a choice.
STABILITY CHANGE
This choice is forced upon us where even doing nothing is a significant
course of action (omission) which could influence the changing course of
events. In such a case, there is no room left to opt out of deciding what to
do. Even "doing nothing" may count as doing something, because it could
preserve or disrupt the status quo.
This type of decision is especially prevalent on important topics of
controversy that effect the conduct of one's life, yet  where reasoned
conviction is the best anyone can aspire to. For example, despite the
uncertainties of political controversies, ethical convictions, religious beliefs,
and legal evidence, nevertheless a person must decide how to vote, what
ethical goals to adopt, whether to join a church, and what verdict to vote
for when on a jury. All such living and momentous choices fall within the
province of practical reasoning in deciding how to act in the world - to
do nothing is, in effect, a kind of action that implies a certain stance on the
issue.
The problem with all these kinds of decisions is that acting on the basis





One could turn out to be wrong. One conclusion that could be drawn
from the observations that plausible reasoning is essentially subjective and,
by its nature, inherently unreliable to some extent, would be that accep-
tance of plausible presumptions on pragmatic considerations rather than
on strictly objective evidence is not rationally justifiable. This point of
view would counsel that logical reasoning should never be based on
subjective opinion. For that opens the floodgates to mere rhetorical
persuasion as a standard of good argument.
This conservative type of view could be based on W. K. Clifford's
argument (1877) that belief should never be based on insufficient evi-
dence: "[I]t  is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe
anything upon insufficient evidence." From this viewpoint, any conclusion
based on anything less than objective (and sufficient) evidence, cannot be
rationally justified.
The difficulty inherent in this conservative viewpoint was well brought
out, however, in William James' (1895) reply to Clifford's argument.
James argued that such an extremely conservative view must stifle action,
because reasonable action must be based on beliefs that are reasonable
even if they cannot be confirmed, and must also undermine knowledge by
l eading to an unwarranted skepticism.
Some of the sting can be taken out of Clifford's repugnance with
pragmatic reasoning if it is acknowledged that: (i) objective evidence is to
be given priority over plausible reasoning where the former is available,
and (ii) it is to be stressed that efforts to collect objective evidence are to
be strongly encouraged when such evidence is available at reasonable cost
and effort. Thus it should be clear that pragmatic or subjective considera-
tions should be no substitute for objective evidence based on observation,
experiment, or mathematical calculation.
Pragmatic reasoning has to do with shifts in a reasoner's commitments
i in reasoned dialogue on issues that are controversial or practical, meaning
that despite lack of' access to deductive certainty or even probability, some
presumptive conclusion must be acted upon. Such reasoning is inherently
fragile, and therefore follows the conservative principle of seeking out the
weakest premise in an argument and only conceding a commitment equal
to that weakest link.
The calculus of plausible reasoning follows this conservative way of
thinking. The least plausible proposition in a set is the weakest link in the
chain, because it represents the greatest possibility of going wrong or
getting into trouble. Hence all plausible inference is based on the weakest
link idea. Once you form a plan of action, you become committed to the
plan, but only to the extent required by the weakest link in the plan. For if
things go wrong or you run into problems, you may have to decide
whether to reject the plan, as a whole, and try to carry out your goals




your goals. Therefore, the reasonable person must not stick to a plan too
dogmatically in every situation. Hence the reasonable person will adhere
to a plan to some degree - t o a degree commensurate with the weakest
parts of the plan.
The plan can be identified with the arguer's position, or set of commit-
ments in dialogue. A set of propositions can be adopted or accepted by
conviction, on a disputable issue, where the real truth of the matter is not
known, because to act on reasoned conviction, one must adopt a point of
view or stance, as a basis for action or inaction. In the loaded gun example
in Section 2. above, Larry doesn't know whether the gun is loaded or not,
but he must act in some manner or other in the situation. Perhaps even if
he leaves the gun alone, it could be dangerous. If so, it is better that he
assumes it is (may be) l oaded, and then carefully checks to see, all the time
operating on the presumption that it is loaded.
In Sections 7. and 8., specific rules of plausible reasoning will be
studied.
5. LEGAL BURDEN OF PROOF
The best known instance of the working of burden of proof in legal
argumentation is the familiar requirement that the prosecutor in a criminal
case must prove guilt "beyond reasonable doubt" to win his case. Then in
such a case, the defence needs only show weakness in the prosecution's
argument in order to win its side of the case. The purpose of this set
imbalance between the two sides of the argument in criminal cases is clear.
In criminal cases, the evidence may be unclear or uncertain because it is
based on the reconstruction of past events which must be conjectured.
Since therefore there is the possibility of error, the goals of dialogue
should be set up in such a way t o try to minimize the conviction of
innocent persons, even at the cost of letting guilty persons go free. The
former is judged the greater injustice, and therefore the legal requirement
of evidence is really based on an intent to safeguard against a particularly
grave danger of injustice inherent in the system of argumentation.
Generally, the prosecution bears the burden of proof in criminal cases.
According to legal scholars, this general requirement is an instance of the
principle, "He who asserts must prove." And in civil cases, the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof on more issues than the defendant. But there
are many exceptions to these general rules.7 An example would be
contributory negligence, the doctrine that one injured t hrough another's
negligence cannot recover if his own negligence contributed to his injury.
In some U.S. states, the plaintiff must prove his freedom from contributory





Legal rules of evidence are formulated generally for each type of case
so that, in principle, both sides to the dispute should know at the outset
where the burden of proof lies. There can be a shift in the burden of proof
during the course of a trial, depending on the issues being argued. But
how burden of proof changes with the advent of a specific issue is also
determined by rules of evidence known at the outset of the case. For
example, in a criminal case, the prosecution may have to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. But if the defendant pleads insanity, then the
burden of proof is upon him to prove that he was insane at the time of the
act at issue.
The party who bears the burden of proof in the law must produce a
strong enough argument to permit a reasonable person to conclude that
his contention is established. However, there are three recognized degrees
of persuasion: (1) by preponderance of the evidence, (2) by clear and
convincing evidence, and (3) beyond reasonable doubt.8
Presumptions are legal devices that can be used to alter a burden of
proof. A presumption is a rule that allows one proposition to be inferred
from another. It is a kind of rule of plausible inference which states what
can normally or customarily be deduced from a particular fact in an
argument. For example, if it can be shown as a fact someone has dis-
appeared without explanation or being heard of for more than seven
years, it may be presumed that this person is dead. This presumption
holds, however, only so far as it goes uncontradicted by further evidence
of the person's being alive.9
Presumptions in law usually occur where a proposition at issue would
be difficult to prove. A presumption can lighten the burden of proof.
Presumptions come into play in a recurring type of situation where normal
expectations about an expected type of outcome in this situation can be
defined or codified according to a pre-established standard.
The concept of a presumption in law is closely tied to the concept of
burden of proof. Both of these factors can be set by the rules of evidence
before a specific case is actually tried. Both factors can be important in
determining, in a particular case, what is to count as a successful realization
of the goal of dialogue by either side of the dispute.
But how does burden of proof work in less strictly organized types of
argumentation? Is it similar to the way it works in the law? It does seem to
be similar in certain important respects because burden of proof is an
important requirement in all persuasive reasoned dialogue. Yet many
contexts are different. The goal of the criminal law is to determine guilt
or innocence (responsibility). Other contexts of dialogue may not share
this goal. Even so, certain general patterns stand out as common to all
persuasive reasoned dialogue.
The burden of proof gets set, ideally, in reasoned dialogue, at the outset




sets out his thesis, which is a proposition. By declaring a proposition as his
thesis, a participant thereby incurs a burden or obligation of proof -
meaning that he is obliged to offer proof, or at least evidence or backing,
for this thesis, if challenged by the other participant in the argument. The
ideal point in reasoned dialogue to set the burden of proof for both
participants is at the beginning of the dialogue, at the initial stage of
discussion.
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, p. 85) call this first stage that
of identifying the dispute, where one participant advances a point of view,
and another participant advances a different point of view, or casts doubt
on the first point of view. Then the second stage of dialogue may be an
attempt to resolve the dispute posed by the two different points of view,
by subsequent discussion.
Rescher (1977, p. 27) also writes of a probative burden, set at the
initiating stage of a dialectical situation, which then remains constant
throughout the subsequent dialogue. Rescher (p. 27) calls this type of
burden the initiating or I-burden, which is characteristically "static, and
rests with the inaugurating side constantly and throughout" the dialogue.
In Rescher's analysis of reasoned dialogue, the burden of proof, once set
for a proposition A in an argument, establishes a presumption that not-A
stands, until the burden of proving A has been discharged (p. 32).
Generalizing on these insights from Rescher, van Eemeren and Groo-
tendorst, and legal rules of evidence, some basic principles can be set
down.
6. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BURDEN OF PROOF
In reasoned dialogue generally, there are two ways in which burden of
proof can be set. First, burden of proof is set externally by the rules of
procedure and goals of dialogue set by the participants, or agreed to by
them. The first item to be noted here is that each participant is required to
have a thesis to be proved, and once this thesis is set, that participant has
a burden of proof (obligation). His goal or obligation is simply to prove
that thesis. However, particular types of dialogue, once identified, will also
serve to sharpen formulation of the burden of proof for both sides. In a
dispute, the burden of proof is equally distributed. In a weakly opposed
difference of opinion, the burden of proof falls exclusively on one side.
External burden of proof is set at the global level of reasoned dialogue.
External conventions affect arguments over the whole course of the
dialogue, from beginning to end. From this perspective, the commitment
rules of dialogue can be viewed as part of the external burden of proof
requirement. For the commitment rules define, over the whole sequence of
dialogue, whether an arguer is committed to a specific proposition, and




In general, there are four factors that influence how burden of proof is
set externally in reasoned dialogue: (1) the theses to be proved by the
participants, (2) the rules of dialogue, especially the commitment rules, (3)
the initial plausibility of the theses to be proved, and (4) presumptions
required by special contexts of dialogue, for example, safety. The fourth
factor refers to special kinds of issues where there may be reason to set
the burden of proof higher against one side. For example, a physician, in
an emergency situation where the patient's life may be in danger, is
expected to "err on the side of life" by acting to presume that there is a
danger if the situation is not clear and the costs of acting to preserve life
are acceptable. The general principle at work here is that of tutiorism, or
taking the safer, known way for the purpose of safety where there is both
risk and uncertainty.
Burden of proof is set internally, at the local level of dialogue, where
requirements of proof or argument are set relative to one specific move,
or pair of moves, in a sequence of dialogue. For example, the maxim
"He who asserts must prove" may dictate that a participant who actively
assents to a specific proposition may be called upon or challenged by
another participant to prove or support that proposition. Or an asker of a
question may be called upon to give evidence for presuppositions of the
question. Of course, these are external commitment rules, but they can
apply at the local level of one specific question-reply interchange. When
they do, specific burdens of proof are set internally, and can be altered or
shifted internally, at specific moves in the sequence of dialogue.
There can be different methods of setting the burden of proof externally
in reasoned dialogue, and there is room for controversy on the subject of
which is the best general method from a theoretical point of view on
dialogue. Generally the goal of persuasive dialogue is to shift the burden
of proof so that one's own side of the argument has become predominant.
And in a dispute one participant's thesis is proved if, and only if', the other
participant's thesis is refuted.
In an evenly matched dispute, the plausibility of each participant's
thesis is roughly equal to the other. Hence any plausible argument newly
advanced during the course of dialogue will tilt the burden of proof
against one side by raising the plausibility of the other. Therefore, it might
be proposed that whichever side has the higher plausibility at the end of
the dialogue should be declared to have the winning (strongest) argument.
However, i n dialogue on some controversial issues, the initial plausibility
of the thesis on one side of the issue to be disputed may be much greater
than that of the other. Thus the burden of proof is much heavier on one
side than the other. Here, a different procedure for evaluating the respec-
tive merits of the arguments on both sides needs to be followed.
Several years ago there was a program shown on Canadian television
called The Great Debate. At the beginning of the program, a controversial
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issue was stated, and two speakers were introduced, each of whom was
slated to argue for one side of the issue. But before any debating began,
the audience was asked to vote for whichever side of the issue each person
presently accepted. This count was recorded, and then after the debate
had taken place, another count was taken of each member of the audi-
ence's new position on the issue. Whichever direction the count had gone
from the first voting to the second indicated the winner of the debate.
This suggests a different approach. It might be proposed that whichever
side has altered the plausibility of his thesis to a higher plausibility at the
end of the dialogue, from the level of plausibility set at the beginning of
the dialogue, should he declared to have the winning (strongest) argument.
Here the external burden of proof, set for the course of the game, is equal,
even if the initial, apparent burden of proof set by the plausibility of each
thesis at the outset of play, was unequal. The inequality of the relative
plausibility of each disputant's thesis is offset by the rule which sets the
goal of the dialogue.
In this type of persuasive dialogue, which could be called a Pierre
Berton dispute the disputant wins who has the greatest positive difference
between the initial plausibility value (at the first move) and the final
plausibility value (at the last move) of the sequence of dialogue.
In a Pierre Berton dispute, each participant has two goals. One is to
persuade the audience to accept his thesis as more plausible than they
thought it to be at the outset of dialogue. The other is to induce a
plausibility increase greater than that effected by the opponent's arguments.
One problem in formulating the requirement for burden of proof in a
Pierre Berton dialogue is to deal with the cases where neither participant
induces a net increase of plausibility, over the course of the dialogue, for
his thesis. This could happen where both arguments are ineffective, and
the plausibility value of each thesis remains the same at the final moves as
it was at the initial move. Or it could happen where one or both arguments
are counterproductive and there is a drop in plausibility over the course of
the argument.
The best way to deal with these cases is to rule that in each of them, the
burden of proof requirement fails to be met. The reason behind this way
of proceeding lies in the first goal of dialogue in a Pierre Berton dispute.
The first goal is to persuade the audience to accept one's thesis as more
plausible. And if this fails, the argument as a whole fails, and the burden of
proof requirement should not be regarded as having been met
Moving on to the case where there is some increase in plausibility value
for a thesis over the course of the dialogue, the burden of proof require-
ment is met by the disputant who induces the greatest net increase in
plausibility. This requirement stems from the second goal of dialogue in a
Pierre Berton dispute.




easier to carry out. One is to rule that if a participant either induces a
decrease in plausibility for his thesis over the course of the argument, or
induces no net increase, then the differential plausibility of his argument is
given a value of zero. "Then if one arguer is assigned a value of zero, for
either of these reasons, any positive gain at all by the other will win the
dispute. Here even a very weak argument could swing the burden to one
side. A second useful rule  is to declare the dispute a tie  if the two
differential plausibility values for each side are equal.
The burden of proof requirements for a Pierre Berton type of dialogue
can be represented in relation to figure 3 below, where T(P) is the
Proponent's thesis, and T(R) is the Respondent's thesis. Generally, we are
assuming that x   0 and y       0 to begin with. The arrows and dotted lines
represent the sequence of moves during the course of the dialogue.
Generally, it is a requirement that for any arguer to meet the burden of
proof requirement, at least one of them must have a net plausibility
increase of greater than zero. Given this is so, then whoever has the
greater increase (if one does) wins the dispute. Thus the burden of proof
requirement for each participant can be expressed as follows.
Proponent: (y
 
- x) > (z - u )




The direct opposition of these win-requirements makes it clearly evident
that a Pierre Berton dialogue is indeed a dispute. For although both
conditions can fail in the event of a tie, if either requirement is met the
other cannot be.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Further studies of burden of proof must study this concept in relation to
(a) rules of plausible reasoning, (b) rules of reasoned dialogue, and (c)
informal fallacies.10 It is notable, however, that many of the traditional
so-called fallacies are not fallacies at all, but are arguments that can
sometimes be reasonable, as instances of plausible reasoning, yet can in
some cases be subject to criticism for specific failures.
Burden of proof is important in reasoned dialogue because various
strengths can be required in argument to persuade a reasonable arguer to
change his opinion. And in the study of the so-called informal fallacies, it
has too often been overlooked that plausible reasoning can be a legitimate
basis for an argument where the evidence is not sufficient or appropriate
to support deductive or inductive arguments.
Arguments based on expert testimony have been classified as informal
fallacies - the argumentum ad verecundiam has traditionally been
thought of as the fallacy of appeal to authority - when often, in fact, such
arguments can be plausible arguments that may carry enough weight to
reasonably shift a burden of proof in one direction in argument.11 Of
course, the reasonableness of such arguments is subject to an array of
reservations. They may be inconsistent, out-of-date, inappropriate to the
topic, or suffer from various faults. But in some cases, they can be
reasonable arguments when they are reasonably supported, and correctly
classified as plausible arguments that can shift a burden of proof in
dialogue.
To cite another instance, the circumstantial ad hominem argument can
i n some cases be a reasonable type of criticism of an arguer's position. If
Alice declares that nobody should smoke because it is unhealthy, while at
the same time puffing on a cigarette, a criticism that she does not practise
what she preaches should rightly shift the burden of proof onto her side
of the argument to justify her position. That does not mean that her
denunciation of smoking as a general practice is strongly refuted or
proved false. But it should indicate, in the proper context of dialogue, that
the burden of proof is on Alice to justify her position if she can. If she
can't meet the burden, it doesn't follow that the proposition 'Nobody
should smoke because it is unhealthy,' is false. But it should be taken
to follow that Alice's advocacy of her argument, taken to include the





Another case in point is the petitio prinicipii. Circular argumentation is
not necessarily fallacious or vicious. And indeed, there should be a burden
of proof on the critic who alleges that a particular argument commits the
fallacy of petitio principii to show (a) what the circle is in the argument,
and (b) why the circle violates some requirement of reasoned argument in
the particular context of dialogue at issue. The way to prove (b) is to give
evidence that there is a requirement of evidential priority in the argument
that has not been met. The requirement of evidential priority is  the
condition that the premises be more plausible than the conclusion that has
been challenged or questioned. So here too, the key to understanding and
proving why circular argumentation is fallacious, when it is objectionable,
lies in an appreciation of how the burden of proof functions in reasoned
dialogue.
The argumentum ad ignorantiam  is , of all the traditional informal
fallacies, the one most intimately connected to burden of proof. It was
John Locke who first noted this connection when he described  ad
ignorantiam as the strategy of requiring an adversary to admit what has
been alleged as a proof or "assign a better." The typical sequence of
question-reply dialogue corresponding to this strategy is the following:
Black : Why A?
White : Why not A?
The fault of reasoned dialogue in such a reply is to be sought in the
backward-chaining burden of a why-question which requires, in this case,
proof of A. Where the rules of dialogue i ndicate that an answer is
required, the pattern of replying to one question by asking another, as
above, is not to be tolerated.
But then, in other cases, replying to a question with another question is
not only reasonable, it may be the only kind of reply that is reasonable.
For as we saw in the example of political dialogue at the beginning of
section 1., a respondent should in some cases shift the burden back onto
the questioner by challenging the question. And indeed, one of the most
important lessons of burden of proof is that this questioning form of reply
may be necessary and correct in reasoned dialogue.
One of the most trenchant and fundamental criticisms of reasoned
dialogue as a method of arriving at a conclusion is that argument on a
controversial issue can go on and on, back and forth, without a decisive
conclusion ever being determined by the argument. The only defence
against this criticism lies in the use of the concept of the burden of proof
within reasoned dialogue. Once a burden of proof is set externally, then it
can be determined, after a finite number of moves in the dialogue, whether
the burden has been met or not. Only by this device can we forestall an
argument from going on indefinitely, and thereby arrive at a definite




Admittedly this way of arriving at a conclusion could be viewed as a
form of argumentum ad ignorantiam, but of course it does not follow that
all argumentation by the method of reasoned dialogue is fallacious or
erroneous. It does show that such argumentation is very often, and
typically, a species of plausible reasoning.
Reasonable dialogue has to do with shifts in the burden of proof
according to the rules of dialogue. These rules may include specific rules
for deductive argument, inductive argument, plausible argument, and other
procedural rules of asking questions and replying to them. There are many
special contexts of dialogue, but we still need to ask - is there some
deeper, fundamental purpose of reasonable persuasive dialogue, and if so
what is its principal benefit'? Why study plausible reasoning if it is so
notoriously subject to fallacies, errors and subtle shifts that can easily lead
us astray?
It is a natural presumption that the most significant benefit of argumen-
tative dialogue - where the goal of dialogue is for the one participant to
convince or persuade the other by reasonable argument - is the insight,
or information increment, produced by the dialogue in the one to whom
the argument is directed. And this is the objective of persuasive reasoned
dialogue that we have emphasized so far. Thus if I become convinced of
some proposition I was not previously committed to, by your argument,
then the value or benefit of the dialogue has been my increased under-
standing, awareness or insight with regard to my own position in the
argument. Good dialogue has altered my position, and thereby deepened,
refined, or articulated that position in some positive way.
However, it may be less often recognized that there may be an important
benefit of argumentative dialogue for the one who has advanced the
reasoned argument, as well as the benefit gained by the recipient. For by
constructing and successfully mounting the reasoned argument, the arguer
may have also succeeded in refining and articulating his own position.
Sometimes at the outset of argument, an arguer's position may be clear in
some respects, but murky and shapeless in others, and through the process
of having to defend his position against an opponent's queries and
criticisms, that position may be more clearly and broadly defined. This
process can give the arguer significant insight into his own position.
This description of reasoned dialogue as a process of deepened insight
into one's own position on a controversial issue is consistent with the
Socratic view of dialogue as a means to attain self-knowledge.  For
Socrates, the process of learning was an ascent from the depths of the
cave towards the clearer light of self-knowledge through the process of
reasoned, and primarily verbal, dialogue with another discussant, on
controversial issues. What Socrates emphasized as a most important
benefit or gain of dialogue was self-knowledge. It was somehow through
the process of articulation and testing of one's best arguments against an
able opponent in dialogue that real knowledge was to be gained.
This Socratic point of view draws our attention to the more hidden and
subtle benefit of good, reasoned dialogue. Not only does it enable one to
rationally persuade an opponent or co-participant i n discussion, but it is
also the vehicle that enables one to come to better understand one's own
position on important issues, one's own reasoned basis behind one's
deeply held convictions. It is the concept of burden of proof that makes
such shifts of rational persuasion possible, and thereby enables dialogue to
contribute to knowledge.
From this Socratic perspective then, the educational value of dialogue is
self-knowledge, the insight offered into the arguer's own convictions
gained through argumentative interaction with an able opponent.13
NOTES
1  See Douglas N. Walton, 'Are Circular Arguments Necessarily Vicious?', American
Philosophical Quarterly 22, 1985, 263-274.
2   See Woods and Walton (1978).
3   For confirming arguments, sey Robinson (1971).
'4   See Barth and Krabbe (1982), Rescher (1977), and van Eemeren and Grootcndorst
(1984) for elaboration of the various components of reasoned dialogue.
5   See Forsyth (1984).
6   See Bratko (1986).
7  Encyclopaedia article (1973).
8   Ibid., p. 914.
9   Ibid., p. 914.
10  See John Woods and Douglas Walton, 'Argumentum ad Verecundiam,' Philosophy and
Rhetoric 7, 1974, 135-153.
	
11  For supporting arguments, see Brown ( 19711) and Sproule ( 1976).
12  This case is also discussed in Walton (1985 ).
13  Research for this paper was supported by a Research Grant from the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council of Canada, a Killam Research Fellowship, and a Fellow-
ship from the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social
Sciences.
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